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ABSTRACT
What should be the appropriate macroeconomic policy to minimize the volatility of output in  a 
resource-based economy, i.e. in an economy that is highly dependent on export of resources with 
very volatile world prices? This paper examines the sources of volatility of output in Russia as 
compared to other countries and concludes that in 1994-2004 volatility of Russian growth rates 
was mostly associated with internal monetary shocks, rather than with external terms of trade 
shocks. 
In  all  countries  that  export  resources  with  highly  volatile  prices,  like  Russia,  volatility  of 
economic growth is associated with volatility of RER, which in turn is mostly caused by the 
inability to accumulate enough foreign exchange reserves (FOREX) in central bank accounts and 
in stabilization funds (SF).  However,  in Russia,  volatility of RER and GDP growth rates in 
recent 10 years was associated  not so much with objective circumstances (terms of trade – TT – 
shocks), but with poor macroeconomic policies – despite intuition, volatility of real exchange 
rate (RER) was caused mostly by internal monetary shocks rather than by external terms of trade 
shocks. 
It is argued that the good (minimizing volatility) macroeconomic policy for Russia would be (1) 
not  to  generate  monetary shocks  (2)  to  cope with inevitable  external  shocks  via  changes  in 
FOREX and SF, while keeping the RER stable. 
1 New Economic School, Moscow, vpopov@nes.ru. Assistance of Anatoly Peresetsky in computing time series 
regressions for Russia is gratefully acknowledged. 
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EXCHANGE RATE IN A RESOURCE-BASED ECONOMY IN THE SHORT-TERM:    
 THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
Vladimir Popov 
1. The problem: options for managing external shocks
Usually  the  issue  of  the  exchange  rate  in  a  resource  based  economy  is  discussed  in  the 
framework of the Dutch disease model – the overvaluation of the exchange rate that undermines 
non-resource  exports  and  has  negative  implications  for  economic  growth.  Russia  definitely 
developed a Dutch disease prior to the currency crises of 1998 (Montes, Popov, 1999; Popov, 
2003a,b) and developed it again recently (the real exchange rate in 2005 exceeded the pre-crisis 
level of 1998). This paper, however, deals with a different issue – the short term adjustment of 
the resource based economy to changes in terms of trade. The long run equilibrium level of the 
real  exchange rate and the policy to influence it  via foreign exchange reserves accumulation 
(disequilibrium exchange  rate)  is  a  separate  issue  that  is  considered  elsewhere  (Polterovich, 
Popov, 2004). 
Back of the envelope calculations. Russia exported in 2005 about 150 million tons of oil and 150 
billion cubic meters of gas worth about $100 billion (all numbers are rounded for simplicity). 
The price of oil and gas varied greatly – only in recent decade oil prices went from $10 to over 
$60  a  barrel  ($70  to  $400  a  ton),  and  gas  price  changed  accordingly  –  they  are  strongly 
correlated with oil prices. Imagine a pretty bad (for Russia), but not totally unrealistic scenario – 
oil prices would drop to $10 a barrel and would stay at this level for 5 years. Annual Russian 
revenues from exports of hydrocarbons would fall to about $20 billion instead of $100 billion, so 
that in 5 years there would accumulate a $400 billion shortfall (Russian GDP at official exchange 
rate in 2005 totaled about $600 billion). How could Russia adjust to such a negative trade shock 
(deterioration in terms of trade)? 
 There are basically three options for the country dependent on export/import of commodities 
with  highly  volatile  prices  to  cope  with  terms  of  trade  (TT)  shocks:  (1)  to  adjust  by 
importing/exporting capital, (2) to carry out adjustment via changes in foreign exchange reserves 
(FOREX) and/or Stabilization Fund (SF) with appropriate sterilization and without changing real 
exchange rate (RER), (3) to adjust via changes in RER (allowing either an adjustment of nominal 
exchange  rate  or  a  change  in  money  supply  altering  the  rate  of  inflation).  The  first  two 
mechanisms  (assuming  other  good  macroeconomic  policies)  are  not  associated  with  the 
adjustment  in real  trade flows and hence do not  entail  adjustments in  the real  sector  of  the 
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economy because the RER remains stable. The third mechanism implies that the volumes of 
export and import change in response to changes in RER, hence the real sector of the economy 
also responds (output changes).  
Option #1: Borrowing abroad to dampen the negative trade shock.  Private international capital 
flows are volatile and do not mitigate fully fluctuation in terms of trade. They seem to be pro-
cyclical, rather than countercyclical – when terms of trade deteriorate, capital flees the country 
instead of coming in. The empirical evidence suggests that this is true for most countries and in 
particular – for Russia. So, in fact, private capital flows add insult to injury and reinforce the 
terms of trade shocks. Official capital flows are counter-cyclical with respect to terms of trade 
shocks  –  international  financial  institutions,  such  as  IMF  and  World  Bank,  and  national 
governments provide additional credits to countries affected by negative trade shocks, but the 
amounts  are  too  small,  if  not  to  say  negligible,  to  fully  counter  the  negative  impact  of 
deterioration of the balance of payments caused by the fall in export prices and the outflow of 
private capital. Suffice it to recall the role of international financial institutions in recent currency 
crises in the world – in East Asian countries in 1997, in Russia in 1998, in Brazil in 1999, in 
Argentina in 2002: in all these cases the official capital flows were by far not enough to counter 
the effects of private capital flight.  So long as the international financial architecture remains as it 
is, countries are basically left to themselves to manage shocks that affect their current and capital 
accounts. In the Russian case it is unreasonable to expect that a country would be able to borrow 
in just several years funds abroad comparable to the size of its GDP. 
 
Option #2. Running down foreign exchange reserves and stabilization fund.  Foreign exchange 
reserves and stabilization funds, if they are large enough, provide a reliable cushion to dampen the 
impact  of  negative  trade  and  capital  flows  shocks.  However  today  among  major  resource 
exporters only Norway (oil exporter) and Botswana (diamond exporter) may have enough money 
in FOREX and SF (more then their annual GDPs) to counter fully the impact of volatile prices for 
resources and capital movements. By the end of 2005, Russia had about $180 billion in FOREX, 
including $30 billion in SF – this is definitely a tangible amount (1/3 of GDP), but at least twice 
as much is needed to survive the “rainy day”. One of the central arguments of this paper is that 
under the current circumstances Russia needs a larger Stabilization Fund. 
Option #3: Real devaluation. Putting aside part of the GDP into FOREX and SF is costly, even 
more so that this money should be invested in short-term low risk and hence low yield securities 
abroad. This is exactly the reason, why current Russian policy of building up FOREX and SF 
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faces heavy criticism at home and abroad: why not use this money for the improvement of health 
care and education, for helping the poor and for investment into ailing infrastructure (the list 
could  be  continued,  of  course),  say  the  critics.  The  counter-argument,  however,  is  no  less 
powerful: if there is no cushion in the form of FOREX and SF, the only way to cope with the 
negative trade shock and the associated outflow of capital is to devalue the real exchange rate. 
When oil prices fall and capital flees, the deteriorating balance of payments could be remedied 
only by nominal exchange rate devaluation (in case of floating exchange rate) or (in case of fixed 
rate)  by the slow down of growth of money supply (due to reduction of FOREX that  is not 
sterilized; if  it  is sterilized,  the balance of payments will  not get back to the equilibrium, so 
FOREX would eventually be depleted). In both cases the result is the real  devaluation of the 
national currency, i.e. the decrease of the ratio of domestic prices (expressed in foreign currency) 
to foreign prices. Such a real devaluation is a bad policy because it inevitably causes adjustments 
in the real sector and these adjustments are by definition temporary. 
Suppose  oil  prices  fall  and  the  ruble  is  devalued  to  keep  the  balance  of  payments  in  the 
equilibrium. For oil producers the positive impact of devaluation neutralizes the negative impact 
of  falling oil  prices,  but  for  other  producers of  tradable goods (machinery,  for instance)  real 
devaluation means higher prices and profits, so there is a reallocation of resources (capital and 
labor) from oil to machinery sector. The problem is that this reallocation is  temporary because 
after some time oil prices will rise and resources should flow in the opposite direction. Inasmuch 
as oil and gas prices fluctuate around the trend, it does not make sense to change the structure of 
the economy in response to their fluctuations – this is just too costly. To word it differently, real 
exchange rate should be as stable as possible; if it fluctuates a lot, this is a definite sign of bad 
policy that misleads economic agents. 
Literature  review.  The  adjustment  to  external  shocks  in  resource  oriented  economies  were 
studied extensively in  the past.  Balassa (1984)  decomposed the policy responses  to external 
shocks into four components (foreign borrowing, export  expansion,  import  compression, and 
slower GDP growth). Auty (1994) argued that East Asian countries (Korea, Taiwan) responded 
to shocks mainly by export growth and import cuts, so did not experience the growth collapse 
after these shocks like Latin American countries (Argentina, Mexico) that responded to shocks 
mainly  by  increasing  their  external  debt.  Implicitly  this  is  an  argument  in  favor  of  real 
devaluation that helps to restore growth by promoting export and curbing import. But such a 
policy comes at a price – real devaluation causes reallocation of capital and labor and thus is 
associated with adjustment costs.  
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Sosunov  and  Zamulin  (2005)  developed  and  calibrated  the  model  of  a  resource  exporting 
economy  experiencing  external  terms  of  trade  shocks  to  study  the  volatility  of  output  and 
inflation:  the  result  was  that  the  monetary  policy  rule  of  responding  to  inflation  and  RER 
fluctuations allows to limit the output-inflation volatility better than the other monetary policy 
rules. Vdovichenko and Voronina (2004) showed that in 1999-2003 the central bank of Russia 
(CBR)  actually  did  not  follow meticulously  the  proclaimed  targets  of  fighting  inflation.  In 
regulating money supply it also took into account changes in output (the deviation of actual 
output from trend) and changes in real exchange rate. The authors estimated separate equations 
for interventions (change in foreign exchange reserves) and sterilization (change in net domestic 
credit). It turned out that the accumulation of reserves accelerated when the RER appreciated, but 
it was not influenced by changes in output and prices. On the contrary, sterilization operations 
were influenced by the behavior of output and prices. Because the appreciation of the RER has a 
suppressing effect on output and prices, it means that by trying to limit the real appreciation of 
the ruble via reserve accumulation the CBR was de facto trying to support output at the expense 
of inflation. 
There are a number of studies of exchange rate misalignment and volatility in various countries (), 
as well as studies that use decomposition technique from the paper by Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
that  analyzed the fluctuations of real  GDP (supply and demand shocks,  demand shocks were 
treated as temporary, i.e. assumed to have no effect on real GDP in the long run). These studies, 
however, are based on a certain assumptions about the nature of the impact of supply and demand 
shocks and about the equilibrium long term real exchange rate that are often difficult to justify. In 
particular, the assumption that nominal shocks (nominal money supply) does not affect the real 
exchange rate in the long run, i.e.  may have only transitionary impact on real exchange (this 
assumption is needed to close the BVAR model) does not appear  to be very reasonable. It may be 
appropriate for more mature market economies, but not for transition economies especially for a 
relatively short (several years) period of time. In transition economies, especially in resource rich 
countries, prices for quite a number of goods are controlled by the government – these prices do 
not change in response to changes in money supply; hence the ratio prices of tradables to non-
tradables (with controlled prices) and thus real exchange rate may react even in the long run to 
changes in money supply.
This paper makes no special  ex ante assumptions on the nature of shocks and the long term 
equilibrium real exchange rate. It is an empirical study of factors that influence output volatility – 
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how terms of trade shocks and internal monetary shocks are mitigated/reinforced by the specific 
macroeconomic  policies,  i.e.  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy,  including  sterilization  of 
changes in money supply. In the next section 2, the evidence from cross-country regressions, 
explaining volatility of output, is presented. Section 3 compares this evidence with the stylized 
facts derived from regressions on Russian time series: it turns out that in both cases volatility of 
GDP growth rates is linked to the volatility of RER, but in Russia, unlike in other countries, 
sterilization policy of the central bank increases the volatility of output. In section 4 a possible 
explanation for the identified puzzle is suggested: as improbable as it sounds, it seems like the 
volatility of Russian GDP growth rates resulted in 1994-2004 mainly from internal  monetary 
shocks,  not from the terms of trade shocks.  Finally section 5 concludes and discusses policy 
implications. 
2. Adjustment to external shocks: evidence from cross-country regressions 
Would a particular country be willing to reduce volatility at the expense of lowering the long 
term growth rate, if there is a tradeoff between volatility and growth? Fortunately, there is no 
such a trade off. As many studies have documented (see Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, Manova, 
2004 for  a  recent  survey  of  the  literature)  the  relationship between volatility  and  growth  is 
negative, i.e. rapid growth is associated with lower volatility. This result holds, if one compares 
fast and slow growing countries, as well as periods of fast and slow growth/recessions in the 
same country. So policies to promote growth, if successful, are likely to reduce volatility as well, 
even though the mechanism of such spin-off is not well understood. Nevertheless, volatility of 
macro  variables  cannot  be  totally  explained  by  their  growth  rates:  even  controlling  for  the 
average speed of change,  there  remain huge variations in  volatility  in  various countries  and 
periods. 
Volatility of GDP is associated with external trade shocks  .  In the first approximation, volatility 
of GDP growth rates is caused by external trade shocks. As the chart below suggests, there is a 
positive correlation, albeit not a strong one, between volatility of trade/GDP ratio and volatility 
of GDP itself: countries with greater volatility of trade experience normally higher volatility of 
growth. 
In turn, volatility of trade is greater in poorer countries and resource exporting countries: 
Trade volatility = 27.6 – 0.001*Ycap75 – 0.25*Net Fuel Import, 
(Adjusted R2 = 25%, N=105, all coefficients significant at 1% level),
where: 
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Trade volatility - standard deviation of external trade to PPP GDP ratio in 1980-99, %, 
Ycap75 – PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, 
Net Fuel Import - Net fuel imports, % of total imports, average for 1975-99. 
As regressions presented later (table 2) suggest, volatility of GDP is in fact linked positively to 
the  volume  of  external  trade  and  its  volatility,  even  if  we  control  for  the  initial  level  of 
development (PPP GDP per capita in 1975 – volatility is greater in less developed countries) and 
average growth rates (rapidly growing countries have lower volatility of growth rates). 
Overall, initial conditions (level of development and average growth rates) and external factors 
(share of trade in GDP, volatility of the terms of trade) and the way the country manages external 
volatility (fluctuations of real exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves) explain at least 50% 
of the aggregate GDP volatility, as the following regression suggests: 
GDPvol = CONST. + CONTR.VAR. + 0.02TR/Y + 0.04TTvol + 1.51RERvol + 2.46FOREXvol
(Robust estimate,R2 = 47%, N=80, all coefficients significant at 10% level or less), where: 
GDPvol – standard deviation of annual growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99, %,
TR/Y – average ratio of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99 (no data for 1975-80), 
TTvol – standard deviation of the terms of trade index for the period of 1975-99, %
RERvol – coefficient of variation of real exchange rate (standard deviation of real exchange rate 
to the dollar in 1975-99 divided by the average real exchange rate) 
FOREXvol – coefficient of variation (standard deviation to average ratio) of foreign exchange 
reserves to GDP ratio for 1975-99 period,
Volatility of trade and GDP in 1980-99
R2 = 0.0661
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Control variables - PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, and annual average growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, %. 
Not a single variable in this regression is strongly correlated with another (R<50%), in particular, 
despite  intuition,  volatilities  of  terms  of  trade  (TT),  real  exchange  rate  (RER)  and  foreign 
exchange  reserves  (FOREX)  are  correlated  very  poorly  (R<20%).  That  is  to  say,  that  the 
volatilities of all three variables (TT, RER, FOREX) contribute largely independently to greater 
GDP volatility. It is argued below that the impact of terms of trade shocks on aggregate volatility 
depends on the way the country manages the shock – by changing FOREX with sterilization and 
keeping RER stable or by allowing the RER to change (FOREX change without sterilization 
leading to changes in domestic prices or change in nominal exchange rate).
The  impact  of  external  trade  shocks  on  volatility  of  GDP depends  on  the  dynamics  of  real 
exchange rate. As was argued above, countries where changes in  terms of trade are absorbed by 
the fluctuations in foreign exchange reserves (rather than by the fluctuations of the real exchange 
rate) cope with the trade shocks better than countries where changes in foreign exchange reserves 
do not follow changes in terms of trade. 
In fact, volatility of RER (coefficient of variation, i.e. standard deviation divided by the average) 
is closely related to the volatility of GDP growth rates (standard deviation) – see chart below:
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Fig. 2. Volatility of grow th rates  of GDP per capita  and of real exchange rate  
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It may be difficult for poor countries to respond to all negative trade shocks and to outflows of 
capital  via changes in reserves, because these foreign exchange reserves are limited (Fanelli, 
2005, p.17). However, there is at least an option of mitigating positive trade shocks and inflows 
of capital via accumulation of reserves. Some countries apparently try to pursue this type of 
policy.
Three options of managing TT shocks under different exchange rate regimes are summarized in 
table 1. Under fixed exchange rate with no sterilization (crawling peg is also regarded as fixed 
rate, since we are interested in volatility, i.e. deviations from trend), nominal exchange rate is 
stable, but domestic inflation accelerates when FOREX expands due to positive trade shock, so 
RER appreciates.  Under  floating  rate,  positive  TT shock  causes  the  appreciation  of  nominal 
exchange rate,  which leads to the appreciation of RER. And only under  fixed exchange rate 
regime (including crawling pegs and dirty floats with nominal rate following a stable trend) with 
full sterilization of money supply changes resulting from FOREX fluctuations due to TT shocks, 
RER can remain relatively stable – because all TT shocks are absorbed by increase/decrease in 
FOREX that are fully sterilized. 
Table 1. Options for managing the terms of trade shock for resource exporting country
Patterns of change in 
variables // Exchange rate 
and macro regime
FOREX Nominal 
exchange 
rate 
RER Correlation between 
FOR-M TT-
FOREX
TT-
RER
FOR-
RER
                                                                    EXTERNAL SHOCKS
Fixed exchange rate 
without sterilization 
(currency board)
VOLAT STABLE VOLAT
(prices)
HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH
Fixed exchange rate with 
sterilization 
VOLAT STABLE STABLE 0 HIGH 0 0
Clean float STABLE VOLAT VOLAT
(nom. rate)
HIGH 0 HIGH 0
The empirical evidence (Popov, Peresetsky, Polterovich, 2005) suggests that volatility of RER 
(coefficient of variation, i.e. standard deviation divided by the mean) was closely related to the 
volatility of GDP growth rates (standard deviation) for a large sample of countries in 1975-1999. 
It also suggests that countries where changes in terms of trade are absorbed by the fluctuations in 
foreign exchange reserves (rather than by the fluctuations of the real exchange rate) cope with 
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the trade shocks better than countries where changes in foreign exchange reserves do not follow 
changes in terms of trade:
 
GDP volatility = CONST. + CONTR.VAR. + Trade Volatility*(0.002TR/Y – 0.04 TT_FORcorr)
(Adjusted R2 = 41%, N=66, all coefficients significant at 10% level or less), where: 
Trade volatility - standard deviation of trade to PPP GDP ratio in 1980-99, %, 
TR/Y – average ratio of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99 (no data for 1975-80), 
TT_FORcorr  –  correlation  coefficients  between the  index of  terms  of  trade  and the  ratio  of 
foreign exchange reserves to GDP, calculated for the period of 1975-99,
Control variables - PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, and annual average growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, %. 
The equation suggests that, if the correlation coefficient is positive (i.e. reserves move in line 
with the terms of trade), volatility of GDP is lower. But if correlation coefficient is negative (i.e. 
reserves move in the direction opposite to changes in terms of trade),  the volatility of GDP 
increases. To test the robustness, more cross-country regressions are presented in table 2. It turns 
out  that  countries  that  carried  out  reasonable  macroeconomic  policies  (accumulated  foreign 
exchange reserves in good times and spent them during “rainy days”) were able to lower the 
volatility of GDP growth rates.
There  is  an  additional  complication,  though.  High  correlation  between  changes  in  TT  and 
FOREX is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for coping with terms of trade shocks in 
such  a  way they  do  not  lead  to  greater  volatility  of  GDP growth  rates.  Suppose  a  country 
responds to the positive TT shock by accumulating FOREX (i.e. carries out “good” policy), but 
this is not enough to prevent an appreciation of RER. Such a situation always occurs in countries 
with  currency  boards  (dollarized  economies  as  well):  FOREX  increase  in  response  to 
improvement of TT, money supply expands, prices increase and RER appreciates. But similar 
mechanism can also operate under fixed exchange rate arrangements or dirty float, if there is no 
complete sterilization of changes in money supply, resulting from changes in FOREX caused by 
TT shocks. Hence, because any volatility in RER contributes to the volatility of GDP growth 
rates,  it  could  be  expected  that  when  RER  moves  in  line  with  FOREX  (even  though  the 
correlation between TT and FOREX is high), volatility of GDP increases.  
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Changes in nominal rate occur quicker than price changes, hence RER can be more volatile 
under cleanly floating exchange rates as compared to currency boards. But if RER changes due 
to nominal rate adjustment, price ratios (between tradables and non-tradables) adjust instantly 
and  the  volatility  of  output  may  be  lower  than  in  case  of  the  adjustment  of  RER  due  to 
fluctuations in money supply resulting from FOREX fluctuations and imposing pressure not only 
on prices, but on output as well.  Since most countries with currencies of their own exercise dirty 
floats and carry out some degree of sterilization, this argument is consistent with the findings of 
Edwards and Magendzo (2003): they find that dollarized economies and currency unions have 
higher volatility than countries with a currency of their own. Our argument, though, is a bit 
different:  among countries  with  currencies  of  their  own external  shocks  are  best  dampened 
(evened out, mitigated) when FOREX absorb completely TT shocks, and fluctuations of FOREX 
are completely sterilized, so that RER stays stable. 
Cross-country regressions support the logical prediction: given the certain level of the correlation 
between TT and FOREX, the volatility of GDP growth rates is the higher in countries with low 
correlation between FOREX and RER and high volatility of RER (table 2). Consider equation 1: 
GDPvol = CONST. + CONTR.VAR. + Trade Volatility*(0.005TR/Y*RERvol – 0.036 
TT_FORcor)
(Robust estimate,R2 = 46%, N=66, all coefficients significant at 10% level or less), where: 
Trade volatility - standard deviation of trade to PPP GDP ratio in 1980-99, %, 
TR/Y – average ratio of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99 (no data for 1975-80), 
TT_FORcor – correlation coefficients between the index of terms of trade and the ratio of foreign 
exchange reserves to GDP, calculated for the period of 1975-99,
Control variables - PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, and annual average growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, %. 
This equation explicitly suggest that for a country with given GDP per capita and average growth 
rates, and with given degree of dependence on external trade (trade to GDP ratio) and volatility 
of external trade, the volatility of GDP growth can be reduced via policies that stabilize RER via 
fluctuations of FOREX in line with the fluctuations in TT. Consider now equation 5 from table 
2:
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Table 2. Factors explaining volatility (correlation between TT and FOREX and RER and 
FOREX) – cross country regressions for 1975-99 (T-statistics in brackets) 
Dependent variable Standard deviation of annual GDP per capita growth 
rates, %
Equations 1 2 3 4 5
Number of observations 66 66 66 66 67
PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $ -.0005
***
(-4.94)
-.0005
***
(-4.02)
-.0004
***
(-4.01)
-.0004
***
(-4.01)
-.0004
***
(-3.11)
Annual  average growth rates  of  GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, % 
-.40***
(-2.56)
-.41***
(-2.87)
-.38***
(-2.74)
-.33**
(-2.33)
-.34**
(-2.61)
(Average  ratio  of  trade  to  PPP  GDP  in 
1980-99) x (Standard deviation of trade to 
PPP GDP ratio in 1980-99)
.001***
(4.47)
.001***
(4.09)
Average  ratio  of  trade  to  PPP  GDP  in 
1980-99
.002**
(2.18)
Correlation  coefficient  between  the  index 
of terms of trade and the ratio of FOREX to 
GDP in 1975-99
-1.35
***
(-2.81)
-1.10
**
(-2.19)
-.97*
(-1.75)
Correlation  coefficient  between  the  real 
exchange rate to the dollar and the ratio of 
FOREX to GDP in 1975-99
.93**
(2.17)
1.11**
(2.42)
(Correlation  coefficient  between  the  real 
exchange rate to the dollar and the ratio of 
FOREX  to  GDP  in  1975-99)x(Standard 
deviation  of  trade  to  PPP  GDP  ratio  in 
1980-99)
.04*
(1.96)
.64
(1.41)
(Standard deviation of  trade to PPP GDP 
ratio  in  1980-99,  %)  x  (Correlation 
coefficient  between  TT  and  the  ratio  of 
FOREX to GDP in 1975-99)
-.004**
(-1.84)
-.006**
(-2.47)
Standard  deviation  of  trade  to  PPP  GDP 
ratio  in  1980-99,  %)x(Correlation 
coefficient between TT index and the ratio 
of  FOREX  to  GDP  in  1975-
99)x(Coefficient of variation of RER to the 
dollar in 1975-99)
.005
***
(5.91)
Standard  deviation  of  trade  to  PPP  GDP 
ratio  in  1980-99,  %)x(Average  ratio  of 
trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99)x(Coefficient 
of variation of RER to the dollar in 1975-
99)
.004
***
(3.68)
TTvol – standard deviation of the index of 
terms of trade in 1975-99
.004
(1.58)
FORvol  –  coefficient  of  variation  of  the 
ratio of FOREX to GDP
1.99*
(1.66)
2.03*
(1.74)
2.02*
(1.71)
2.46**
(2.01)
Constant 5.4***
(11.37)
4.5***
(5.45)
4.5***
(5.46)
4.4***
(5.17)
3.6***
(3.72)
R2  , % 46 49 49 49 50
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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GDPvol = CONST. + CONTR.VAR.+0.24TR/Y + 0.044TTvol + 2.46FORvol – 0.97TT_FORcor 
+ 1.11RER_FORcor 
(Robust estimate, R2 = 50%, N=67, all coefficients significant at 10% level or less, except TTvol 
coefficient which is significant at 12% level), where: 
TTvol – standard deviation of terms of trade index, %, 
TR/Y – average ratio of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99 (no data for 1975-80), 
TT_FORcorr – correlation coefficients between the index of terms of trade and the ratio of 
foreign exchange reserves to GDP, calculated for the period of 1975-99, 
RER_FORcor  – correlation coefficient between real exchange rate and FOREX,  
FORvol – coefficient of variation (standard deviation to average ratio) of foreign exchange 
reserves to GDP ratio for 1975-99 period,
Control variables - PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, and annual average growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, %. 
The equation suggest that in a country with given level of development and with given growth 
rates, given trade to GDP ratio and given volatility of trade and capital flows (resulting in the 
volatility of FOREX), volatility of economic growth can be reduced by policies of responding to 
TT shocks via FOREX fluctuations that prevent RER from fluctuating together with FOREX (low 
correlation between the movement of RER and FOREX). 
In fact, the these two correlation coefficients – that between TT and FOREX, and that between 
RER and FOREX – are closely correlated themselves (see chart below ) suggesting that most 
countries, when faced with a TT shock respond not only by adjusting their foreign exchange 
reserves, but also by changing the real exchange rate of their currency in the same direction. The 
point  is  that  countries  that  completely absorbed TT shocks  through changes  in  FOREX (so 
correlation  between  TT  and  FOREX  was  high)  and  prevented  their  RER  from  fluctuating 
together  with TT and FOREX (so that  the correlation between FOREX and RER was low) 
experienced less volatility than the others. On the chart  below the extreme cases are that of 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso and Ireland – these countries had high TT–FOREX correlation and 
low RER–FOREX correlation and experienced low volatility of growth (standard deviation of 
GDP per capita  growth rates  in 1975-99 are  2.7%, 3.7% and 3.2% respectively).  The other 
extreme points are Brazil and Peru, which responded to TT shocks not via changes in FOREX 
(low TT–FOREX correlation), but via changes in RER (high RER–FOREX correlation), and 
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hence experienced high volatility of growth (standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rates 
in 1975-99 are 4.5% and 7.4% respectively). 
To test  this  hypothesis  explicitly  a  variable  for  sterilization  (correlation  coefficient  between 
FOREX to GDP ratio and M2 to GDP ratio) was introduced into the right hand side of the 
equation – the higher this coefficient, the lower is  sterilization of changes in the money supply 
resulting from the fluctuations of FOREX. The resulting equation is given below (it is equation 5 
from table 2, but with additional sterilization variable; it is not shown  in table 2):
GDPvol = CONST. + CONTR.VAR.+0.24TR/Y + 0.044TTvol + 2.44FORvol – 1.65TT_FORcor 
+ 1.23RER_FORcor + 1.02M_FORcor
(N=58, R2=47, all coefficients significant at less than 8% level, except for TTvol coefficient, 
which is significant at 13% level), where: 
Control variables - PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, and annual average growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, %, 
M_FOR cor – no-sterilization variable, correlation coefficient between FOREX to GDP ratio and 
M2 to GDP ratio in 1975-99, and all other notations are same as before.
It turns out that countries that were carrying out sterilization policies (low M_FORcor), while 
responding to TT shocks via changes in FOREX (high TT_FORcor) and not allowing the RER to 
fluctuate together with FOREX (low RER_FORcor), were most successful in reducing volatility 
of their economic growth.  
Fig .  . Co rre latio n  coe ff icie nt s b e tw ee n  TT  and  FOREX an d  be tw e en  RER an d 
FO REX in 1975- 99
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Similar results can be obtained for explaining the volatility of RER:
RERvol = 0.42 +  0.29FOR_RERcor – 0.27TT_RERcor – 0.26TT_FORcor + 0.017FOR_Mcor
 (Robust estimates, N=59, R2=28, all coefficients significant at less than 6% level, except for 
coefficient of FOR_M2cor that is insignificant), where all notation are same as before. 
It  turns out that the volatility of RER is linked positively (although not significantly) to the 
correlation between FOREX and M2 (no sterilization indicator),  positively and significantly to 
the  correlation  coefficient  between  FOREX and  RER (suggesting  that  volatility  of  RER  is 
higher, when, for instance, accumulation of FOREX cannot prevent the appreciation of RER), 
but it is linked negatively to the correlation coefficients between  TT and FOREX (it is high, 
when changes in FOREX do not absorb fully the TT shock, so RER changes) and between TT 
and RER (suggesting, probably, that when RER changes without TT shocks, i  e. due to domestic 
shocks, this correlation coefficient is low and volatility of RER is high). 
Large  government  debt  and external  debt  contribute  to  greater  volatility.  It  appears  that  the 
response to a negative terms of trade shock via external debt accumulation, even if such an 
option is feasible (i.e. even if capital is not fleeing the country in bad times), helps to maintain 
the growth rate only temporarily, but increases the volatility of output in the longer term. Why 
capital is fleeing the country in times of the greatest need, i.e., when a country experiences an 
adverse trade shock? There may be several explanations that are tested below:
(1) large  government  debt  prohibits  the  authorities  from  borrowing  more  money  in  the 
international capital markets,
(2) large  external  debt  prohibits  the  private  agents  from  borrowing  more  money  in  the 
international capital markets in bad times,
(3) herd behavior of international investors that pull the money out of the country experiencing 
negative trade shock: even though this country’s government debt and external debt are low, 
the credit  rating  of  a  country  deteriorates  because  of  its  reduced ability  to  earn  foreign 
currency and service its debt.  
The evidence below suggests that all three factors played a role. Government debt and external 
debt are strongly correlated (see chart below), but not necessarily because government debt is 
mostly to foreigners or because external debt consists largely of the government debt. 
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With respect to government debt, it looks like the volatility is higher, when the debt is higher, 
irrespective of the external debt:
GDP  volatility  =  CONST.  +  CONTR.VAR.  +  TRvol*(0.001TR/Y  –  0.04TT_FORcor   – 
0.003M1/Y + 0.0004GD/Y)
(Adjusted R2 = 42%, N=52, all coefficients significant at 10% level or less), where: 
M1/Y – the ratio of M1 to GDP in 1998, % (to control for the monetization of the economy that 
helps to absorb shocks),
INVcl – investment climate index from ICRG (ranges from 0 to 100%, the higher the better the 
climate),
GD/Y – average ratio of the government debt to GDP in 1975-99, %
Because the government debt is quite correlated with external debt, both variables cannot be 
introduced into the  right  hand side  of  the equation  simultaneously.  It  is  interesting  to  note, 
though, that substituting government debt for the external debt yields similar results:
GDP volatility = CONST. + CONTR.VAR. + TRvol*[0.001ED/Y + TT_FORcor(0.006Ycap75– 
0.001INVcl – 0.001M2/Y] 
(Adjusted R2 = 42%, N=42, all coefficients significant at 10% level or less), where: 
Control variables - PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, and annual average growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, %, 
ED/Y – average ratio of the government debt to GDP in 1975-99, %
Governm ent debt and external debt as a % of GDP, average for 1975-99 
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The final result thus is the negative impact of all three factors on volatility of growth rates of 
GDP – worse investment climate (that worsens in times of adverse trade shocks and lowers the 
credit rating), larger external debt and government debt limit possibilities for external financing 
forcing countries in trouble to adjust to shocks via changes in RER and hence real restructuring. 
Private  capital  flows contribute  to  greater  volatility  instead of  mitigating it.  It  is  shown in 
Fanelli, (2005, p. 19) that “a close relationship between the volatility of  imports and exports 
exists  in  the  case  of  both  high-income and  developing  countries,  although  the  volatility  of 
imports tends to be higher than the volatility of exports in many countries, suggesting that the 
bulk of macroeconomic fluctuations fall on imports. This suggests that imports and exports are 
correlated and is consistent with the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka,  1980) 
according to which financial market imperfections are present all around the world and impede 
that countries generate large current account deficits…..These countries tend to induce severe 
cuts in domestic absorption – and therefore in imports – when they face a fall in export revenues 
(due, for example, to a fall in the terms of trade). The credit constraints in international credit 
markets  make  the  bulk  of  the  necessary  adjustment  fall  on  current  absorption  rather  than 
allowing it to be distributed over time” (Fanelli, 2005, p. 19). 
It is also explicitly tested whether the inflows of capital (“fresh money” indicator equal to the 
difference between the reserve accumulation and the result of the trade account) contribute to 
consumption volatility (CONSvol) after controlling for GDP volatility and TT volatility: it turns 
out that all coefficients are significant and have the correct sign (Fanelli, 2005, p.32): 
CONSvol = -0.02 + 0.76GDPvol + 0.32TTvol + 0.13FRESH MONEY
(N= 66,  R2=66,  all  coefficients  significant  at  1%  level, White  heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors & covariance). 
Running cross-country regressions with another indicator – private capital flows as a % of GDP – 
yields similar results: 
GDPvol=CONST.+CONTR.VAR.+TRvol*(0.0004GD/Y+0.005CF/Y–0.04TT_FORcor  – 
0.002M1/Y)
 (N=52, R2=43%, all coefficients significant at 10% or less),
 and
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GDPvol  =  CONST.  +  CONTR.VAR.  +  TRvol*[0.007CF/Y  +  TT_FORcor(0.005Ycap75– 
0.001INVcl) – 0.001M2/Y + 0.0004ED/Y]
 (N=42, R2=65%, all  coefficients significant at  10% or less,  except for the interaction term 
between external debt and trade volatility, which is significant only at 12.5%),
 and
GDPvol = 4.1. + TRvol*[TT_FORcor(0.005Ycap75– 0.001INVcl) + 0.0005ED/Y –  0.001M2/Y] 
+ 0.25CF/Y
(Robust estimate, N=42, R2=71%, all coefficients significant at 1% or less), where:
Control variables - PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $, and annual average growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99, %, 
CF/Y – average gross private capital flows (% of PPP GDP in1975-99) and all other notations 
are the same.
Thus, private capital flows only “rock the boat” – increase the volatility of output instead of 
mitigating it – because the deterioration of terms of trade is normally associated with the outflow 
of  private  capital,  whereas  positive  trade  shocks  are  accompanied  by  the  inflow of  private 
capital. This is very much true for the Russian case as well – later it is shown that private capital 
flows and terms of trade move pro-cyclically, and even though official capital flows move in the 
opposite direction and mitigate somewhat TT shocks, they are by far not enough to counter the 
pro-cyclical impact of private capital flows. 
3. Russian experience in managing external shocks
Russian  experience  in  managing  the  external  shocks  in  1992-2005  does  not  look  very 
impressive, to put it mildly. GDP growth rates fluctuated greatly (fig.1), the rates of inflation 
varied dramatically (fig. 2) and real exchange rate was most unstable even though in recent 5 
years  monetary  authorities  were  trying  to  prevent  its  appreciation  by  accumulating  FOREX 
(fig.3). In 1992-96 RER increased more than twofold, then fell during the August 1998 currency 
crisis nearly by half, and then increased again nearly twofold in 1999-2005 (fig. 3).  Because 
volatility of output in all countries is closely correlated with the fluctuations of real exchange 
rate, no wonder Russian growth rates were very volatile. Unfortunately Russia did not manage to 
prevent sharp fluctuations in real exchange rate of the ruble, which disoriented producers and 
consumers and forced the economy to adjust to external shocks via real restructuring, which in 
turn caused greater volatility of output. No surprise, the highest volatility of output in Russia in 
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recent 10 years was observed immediately after the 1998 currency crisis that led to the greatest 
devaluation of real exchange rate.  
Fig. 1. G DP  gr ow t h rat e s in  Ru s sia, %, 1990- 2004
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In Russia, pretty much like in other resource oriented economies volatility of growth rates of 
GDP  is  strongly  correlated  with  the  volatility  of  RER  (fig.  4).  However,  there  are  some 
important inconsistencies with the international story, i.e. with conclusions that could be derived 
from cross-country comparisons. 
Fig. 4. Volatility of GDP (le ft scale ) and RER (right scale) in Russia in 1994-2004,  % (volatility 
is  com puted as standard deviation for 16 preceeding quarters)
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First, volatility of GDP growth rates in Russia is linked to the volatility of external trade even 
stronger  than  in  most  other  countries.  Despite  intuition,  however,  it  is  import,  not  export, 
volatility that is closely  correlated with the volatility of GDP growth rates. Even more so, it is 
clearly visible on the chart below (fig. 5) that changes in  import volatility sometimes lags behind 
changes in real GDP volatility, so it is plausible to conclude that the volatility of imports is caused 
by the volatility of GDP and not vice versa.
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Fig. 5. Volatility of grow th rates  of real GDP (right scale ), nom inal export and 
im port (le ft scale )  in Russia in 1994-2004 (volatility is  com puted as  standard 
deviation for 16 preceding  quarters ), % 
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Up 70 % of Russian exports consists of fuel goods (gas, oil, oil products) with highly volatile 
prices, so it could have been hypothesized that the volatility of Russian growth is caused by the 
terms of trade shocks, i.e. changes in the world prices for oil and gas. However, volatility of 
exports and volatility of oil and gas prices are not closely related to the volatility of GDP growth 
rates (see chart below). 
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Overall, volatility of GDP growth rates in 1994-2004 is very well explained by the volatility of 
external trade:
GDPvol = -0.0015 – 0.11Ygr +0.36TRvol
(N = 28, R2=86%, all coefficients are significant at 1% level, DW = 1.87) , where
GDPvol – standard deviation from trend of GDP growth rates in 16 preceding quarters,
Ygr – average growth rates of GDP for 16 preceding quarters,
TRvol – volatility of nominal $ value of external trade in 16 preceding quarters. 
However, this regression obviously captures the post-factum impact of GDP volatility on import 
volatility,  when  import  changes  in  response  to  changes  in  income  (GDP).  To  analyze  the 
mechanism of the influence of terms of trade shocks on the volatility of GDP, it is necessary to 
have a closer look at the changes in real exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves.
The best equations obtained for explaining volatility of GDP growth rates by  RER volatility are 
the following: 
GDPvol = 0.0002 – 0.04Ygr + 0.002TTvol +0.001RERvol
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(N=28, R2=95, all coefficients significant at less than 3% level DW=1.72)
and 
GDPvol = 0.002 – 0.02Ygr + 0.002TTvol + 0.001RERvol – 0.003TT_FORcor
(N=28,  R2=95,  all  coefficients  significant  at  less  than  2%  level  except  for  Ygr,  which  is 
significant at 11%,  DW=1.88), where:
GDPvol – standard deviation from trend of GDP growth rates in 16 preceding quarters,
Ygr – average growth rates of GDP for 16 preceding quarters,
TTvol – volatility of world oil  in 16 preceding quarters,
RERvol – volatility of RER index in 16 preceding quarters,
TT_FORcor – correlation coefficient between TT and FOREX in preceding 16 quarters. 
Adding the indicator of the volatility of FOREX and the correlation coefficient between the 
movement  of  RER and FOREX does  not  improve  the  goodness  of  fit;  both  variables  have 
predicted negative sign, but are not statistically significant. 
These  results  could  be  interpreted  in  line  with  the  previous  findings  from  cross-country 
regressions: given the terms of trade shocks, in particular, changes in oil prices (that are closely 
correlated with gas prices – another major item of Russian export), the volatility of the economy 
(GDP growth rates) is lower, the higher the correlation between TT and FOREX and the lower the 
volatility of RER. There is an important deviation, however, from the international story that was 
derived from cross-country regressions. As fig. 4 suggests, volatility of GDP is extremely closely 
correlated with the volatility of real  exchange rate:  it  seems like periods of high volatility of 
Russian GDP growth were associated not so much with volatility of oil and gas prices, but rather 
originated due to direct government/central bank mismanagement – inability to keep the RER 
stable. Volatility of RER in time series regressions for Russia turns out to be by far the most 
important and the most statistically significant variable.
Second, high volatility of Russian GDP and RER is associated not so much with the volatility of 
oil  prices,  but  with the absence of sterilization policy – high correlation between changes in 
money supply (M2/GDP ratio) and foreign exchange reserves (FOREX/GDP ratio). The higher 
the correlation coefficient between M and FOREX, the lower the volatility of RER and GDP – 
these indicators move obviously in opposite directions (fig.6). 
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Fig. 6. Volatility of RER (right scale) and correlation coefficient betw een M2 and FOREX in 
Russia in 1994-2004 (le ft scale ),  % (volatility is  com puted as  s tandard deviation for 16 
preceeding quarters )
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Such a result – negative impact of sterilization on volatility of GDP – is directly the opposite 
from the result observed in the cross-country comparisons and it seems to be inconsistent with 
economic logic. As was argued earlier, the best exchange rate regime for mitigating volatility is 
the  stable  real  exchange  rate  achieved  via  relatively  stable  nominal  rate  (crawling  peg), 
absorption of TT shocks by the fluctuations of FOREX, and sterilization of changes in money 
supply  caused  by  the  FOREX  fluctuations.  To  reiterate,  in  cross  country  regressions  no-
sterilization policy (high correlation coefficient between FOREX and M2) turns out to be an 
important and significant factor of higher, not lower volatility of GDP growth rates, whereas in 
regressions on Russian time series it is exactly the opposite.
4. Sources of output volatility: external versus internal shocks 
This puzzle is resolved by making the distinction between external and internal shocks. As was 
argued earlier (table 1), in the presence of external shock, sterilization under fixed nominal rate 
means low correlation between FOREX and money supply, so the higher this correlation, the 
less pronounced sterilization and the higher the volatility of growth. But if shocks come from 
domestic sources, for instance from the central bank altering money supply without any external 
shocks,  high  correlation  between  M  and  FOREX  signifies  the  absence  of  internal  shocks 
themselves – how can money supply change, if FOREX remain stable and on top of that all 
changes in money supply are sterilized?  
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Consider, for instance an exogenous increase in money supply by the central bank in the absence 
of  external  shocks.  Under  fixed nominal  rate  this  would cause  an increase in  prices  (hence 
increase in RER and additional RER volatility) and a drop in real interest rates, and later – the 
balance of payments deficit (due to lower trade competitiveness and outflow of capital), decrease 
in FOREX and finally – the contraction of the money supply. Under fully flexible rate monetary 
expansion would also immediately cause increase in prices (hence increase in RER) and decrease 
in real interest rates, and later devaluation (with no changes in FOREX). In both cases initially 
RER would change, which is bad for volatility of GDP, while the correlation between money 
supply and FOREX would be low (money supply increases, but FOREX do not), so high GDP 
and RER volatility would be associated with low correlation between FOREX and M. High 
correlation between FOREX and M under the circumstances, i.e. if there are no external shocks, 
is possible only if money supply is stable.
Table 3 summarizes changes in variables in question caused by internal monetary shock. The 
bottom line is that, unlike in table 1, which describes the story of the dynamics of variables 
during the external shock, in this case, under the domestically generated monetary shock, lower 
volatilities  of  GDP and  RER  are  associated  with  higher,  not  lower  correlation  coefficients 
between FOREX and M. This higher FOR_Mcor coefficients prove in fact that the exogenous 
monetary shocks are largely absent. 
Table 3 . Impact of internal monetary shocks on volatility (in the absence of terms of trade 
shocks)
Patterns of change in 
variables // Exchange rate 
and macro regime
FOREX Nominal 
exchange 
rate 
RER Correlation between 
FOR-M TT-
FOREX
TT-
RER
FOR-
RER
INTERNAL MONETARY SHOCKS (IN THE ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS)
Fixed exchange rate 
without sterilization 
(currency board)
VOLAT STABLE VOLAT
(prices)
0 0 0 HIGH
Fixed exchange rate with 
sterilization 
STERILIZATION  MEANS  THE  ABSENCE  OF  INTERNAL 
MONETARY SHOCKS BY DEFINITION (high FOR_Mcor)
Clean float STABLE VOLAT VOLAT
(nom. rate)
0 HIGH 0 0
Regressions  on  Russian time series  data  provide  additional  support  for  the existence  of  the 
described  relationship.  First,  unlike  in  cross-country  regressions,  TTvol  does  not  have  any 
significant explanatory power for RERvol, even when included into the right hand side of the 
equation without any other variables. Although TTvol matters for explaining the GDP growth 
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rates volatility,  the significance of  coefficient  of  RERvol  is  much higher.  Second,  unlike in 
cross-country  regressions,  the  correlation  coefficient  between  TT  and  RER  is  negative,  not 
positive. And, third, unlike in cross-country regressions, FOR_Mcor, the correlation coefficient 
between M and FOREX, characterizing the absence of sterilization policies, enters into the right 
hand side with significant, but negative sign:
RERvol = 34.1 – 0.52AR(-1) – 30.7FOR_Mcor  –   4.7TT_RERcor + 0.01TTvol
(N=28,  R2= 91,  all  coefficients  significant  at  less  than  1% level,  except  for  TTvol  that  is 
insignificant (99%), AR(-1) term is included because without it DW statistics is bad)
and 
RERvol = 16.5 + 0.95AR(-1) – 16.4 RER_FORcorr
(N=28, R2= 95, all coefficients significant at less than 1% level, AR(-1) term is included because 
without it DW statistics is bad), where:
AR(-1) – volatility of RER in the preceding 16 quarters,
RER_FORcorr – correlation coefficient between RER and FOREX,
FOR_Mcor – correlation coefficient between FOREX and M2,
TT_RERcor – correlation coefficient between TT and RER
TTvol – volatility of oil prices, $ a barrel.
These equations imply that volatility of RER is negatively, not positively as in cross-country 
regressions, linked to the non-sterilization indicator (correlation between changes in FOREX and 
M2) and to the correlation between RER and FOREX. As was argued above, this is consistent 
with  the  assumption  that  the  volatility  of  RER in  Russia  was  primarily  caused  by  internal 
monetary shocks: expansion,  for  instance,  of  money supply happening without  any apparent 
reason, led to the increase in prices and appreciation of RER (higher volatility of RER); whereas 
TT of trade did not change (so correlation between TT and RER was low) and FOREX were 
stable (so the correlation between money supply and FOREX was low), the volatility of GDP 
was on the rise due to RER appreciation.  
Hence, it may be hypothesized that the main causes of volatility in Russia were not foreign, but 
domestic made, i.e. the volatility of growth resulted not so much from the volatility of terms of 
trade (even though TT volatility was high and Russia was very dependent on exports of oil and 
gas with highly volatile prices). It is one of the main conclusions of our paper: even in countries 
that export resources with highly volatile prices, like Russia, volatility of economic growth could 
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be  associated  not  so  much  with  objective  circumstances  (TT  shocks),  but  with  poor 
macroeconomic policies – inability to keep the RER stable. 
The additional evidence of poor macroeconomic policy in Russia is on chart below. First, Russia 
failed to respond to the TT fluctuations by altering FOREX – only in 3 quarters out of 28, for 
which correlation coefficients between TT and FOREX were computed for 16 quarters moving 
window, this correlation coefficients were higher than 50%.
Second, for most sub-periods of 1994-2004 these correlation coefficients were moving in the 
direction opposite to the volatility of oil prices – when volatility of TT increased, government 
policies of stabilizing RER via  adjusting FOREX in line with changes in TT were especially 
weak. Instead of mitigating the volatility from external shocks,  the Russian government  and 
monetary authorities  were  adding  insult  to  injury by contributing  to  the  economic volatility 
through generating their own monetary shocks. 
In a regression linking RER volatility with the volatility of terms of trade (proxied by volatility 
of oil prices) and volatility of M2 growth rates, only the latter variable is significant, while the 
former is not:
Vo latilit y o f T T ( o il pr ice s , cen ts  a b arre l - le f t s cale)  an d co rre latio n  coe ff icie nt  be t w e e n 
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 RERvol = -0.02 + 0.83AR(-1) + 0.01TTvol + 1.14Mvol
(N=27, R2=86%, DW = 2.08, all coefficient significant at 6% level or less, except TT volatility 
coefficient that is insignificant), where:
Mvol – standard deviation of M2 quarterly growth rates in 16 preceding quarters.
To put it differently, the instability of RER is determined mostly by the instability of the money 
supply, not by the instability of the terms of trade. 
Similarly, in a regression linking GDP growth rates volatility to TT volatility, RER volatility and 
M2 volatility, all three explanatory variables are highly statistically significant:
GDPvol = -0.01  + 0.003TTvol + 0.07RERvol +0.27Mvol
(N=28, R2=97, DW=1.7, all coefficients significant at less than 2% level).
That is to say, even controlling for the volatility of terms of trade and volatility of RER, volatility 
of output growth in 1994-2004 in Russia was dependent on the volatility of money supply caused 
by unstable monetary policy. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications
In countries that export resources with highly unstable prices, like Russia, volatility of economic 
growth is associated with volatility of RER, which in turn is mostly caused by the inability to 
accumulate  enough  reserves  in  FOREX and  SF.  The  option  of  attracting  foreign  capital  in 
difficult  times,  when the  country  faces  a  negative trade  shock,  seems to  be unavailable  for 
resource based  developing countries because private capital flows change pro-cyclically with 
terms of trade, thus reinforcing the trade shocks, whereas official capital flows, even though may 
be counter-cyclical,  are not enough to compensate the destabilizing effect of  private capital 
movements. 
Russian  experience  in  this  respect  constitutes  no  exception.  First,  as  charts  below suggest, 
private capital flows reinforce the destabilizing effects of trade shocks, whereas official capital 
flows and changes in foreign exchange reserves,  even though mitigate  trade shocks,  are not 
enough to counter them completely. To investigate the issue more closely, all capital flows were 
grouped into three categories: (1) PCF – net private capital flows (including sizable “errors and 
28
omissions” in the balance of payments that are widely believed to be a euphemism for capital 
flight),  minus  sign  indicates  outflow  of  capital,  (2)  NPB  –  net  borrowing  by  the  public 
authorities, minus sign indicates the outflow of capital, and (3) dFOREX – increase in FOREX, 
plus sign indicates the outflow of capital. The sum of these items equals current account deficit 
(CA):
CAdeficit = PCFinflow + NPBinflow – FOREXincrease 
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It turns out that PCF move mostly in line with oil prices (terms of trade), although the correlation 
is weak, NGB is negatively (also weakly) correlated with oil prices, whereas increase in FOREX 
(dFOREX)  exhibits  pretty  high  positive  correlation  with  oil  prices.  It  means  that  only  net 
government borrowing and change in reserves help to counter trade shocks, whereas private 
capital flows reinforce these shocks. 
Second, the mitigating influence of official capital flows and changes in FOREX was not enough 
to counter all the terms of trade shocks, so real exchange rate fluctuated greatly in response to 
changes in terms of trade. 
 Third, the most surprising finding is that fluctuations of RER were caused not so much by the 
TT shocks, but by domestically generate monetary shocks – highly volatile monetary policy. 
That is why in Russia, volatility of GDP growth rates in recent 10 years was associated not so 
much  with  objective  circumstances  (TT  shocks),  but  with  poor  macroeconomic  policies  – 
Pr ivate  capit al f lo w s ( in clu d ing  er ro rs  and  om iss ion s ) an d ch an ge  in FO REX  in 1994-
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unstable money supply that contributed to the volatility of RER more than external terms of trade 
shocks. 
The policy implications thus are pretty obvious. The good macroeconomic policy for Russia 
would be (1) not to generate monetary shocks (2) to cope with inevitable external shocks via 
changes in FOREX and SF, while keeping the RER stable. 
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